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Abstract
In 2007 and 2008 Polish governments introduced a series of reforms which led
to a substantial reduction in the tax “wedge” (in Polish: “klin”) on labour. We
show that when considered together the package of introduced reforms brought
much greater reductions in the tax burden compared to a widely discussed 15%
“ﬂat tax”. In the analysis we show the eﬀects of the reforms both for the
employed and for the non-employed populations. The latter analysis is done in
such a way as to account for the entire (simulated) distribution of wages of the
non-employed and shows interesting diﬀerences between the eﬀects of reforms on
employed and non-employed individuals. We argue that to fully appreciate the
eﬀect of reductions in labour taxation it is important to bear in mind that one
of the reasons for introducing them is to make employment more likely for those
who currently do not work. Given the extent of the reductions in the “klin” it is
somewhat surprising that so far so little attention has been given to the recent
Polish reforms.
Keywords: work incentives, tax wedge, labour costs, employment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H24, J21, J31.
∗This paper uses microsimulation tools developed in a project realised for the Polish Ministry of
Labour and Social Aﬀairs entitled “Micro-simulation model as a tool in the analysis of the labour
market” funded by the European Social Fund (see: www.simpl.pl). Data from the Polish Household
Budgets’ Survey have been provided by the Polish Central Statistical Oﬃce. The usual disclaimer
applies.
†Leszek Morawski is lecturer at the Department of Economics, University of Warsaw.
‡Micha  l Myck (corresponding author) is Research Associate at DIW-Berlin, International Research
Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and Research Fellow at IZA-Bonn. e-mail: mmyck@diw.de.
11 Introduction
Compared to the attention received by the “ﬂat tax” reforms in countries such as
Estonia, Lithuania or Russia, the coverage of the recent reforms of the labour costs in
Poland has been modest to say the least. This may be puzzling given the signiﬁcant
extent of these reforms and demonstrates that it is often not the content but the
form that matters for drawing attention. The high tax “wedge” (in Polish: “klin”)
on labour has been long identiﬁed as one of the major concerns of economic policy
in Poland but until recently reducing it was either a low priority for governments or
could not get through the full legislative process because of the presidential veto. It is
to some extent surprising that the most signiﬁcant reduction in the “klin” in Poland
since the economic transition begun has been proposed and largely implemented by a
government which could hardly be described as one with a market-oriented economic
agenda.
The tax wedge on labour is a potentially important determinant of economic activ-
ity. It has been found to be one of the signiﬁcant factors behind the rapidly growing
unemployment levels in Europe since the 1960s, and one of important reasons why
reducing unemployment has proved so diﬃcult.1 At the same time reduction in taxes
on labour has been found to be an important element of recent successful reform pack-
ages in Europe (see Nickell (2001) and Annett (2007)). Somewhat surprisingly, given
the role assigned to the tax wedge, there is not much detailed analysis of the level
and distribution of the tax burden on labour in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. The issue of the tax wedge is often discussed in the context of an aggregate
tax burden and an overall mix of government revenues from diﬀerent sources. More
recent analysis focuses on the implications of introducing the “ﬂat tax”, but also in
this strand of the literature it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd detailed analysis of changes in the
distribution of the tax rates following the reforms, and even more so some comparative
analysis of consequences of potential counterfactual policy options.2 One of the impor-
1See for example the discussions in Layard and Nickell (1986), Lockwood and Manning (1993),
Nickell (1997), Sieberst (1997), Nickell (1998) Fiorito and Padrini (2001), and Saint-Paull (2004). In
Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) the authors estimate that institutional changes contributed to
about half of the increase in unemployment in Europe between 1960s and 1990s. Of this half about
a ﬁfth has been estimated to relate to taxes on labour. For an interesting analysis of changes in
marginal tax rates in Canada see Davies and Zhang (1996).
2An early interesting survey of tax policy and unemployment with policy implications for transition
countries can be found in Zee (1996). For a recent paper on the comparison of sources of government
2tant roles assigned to the reforms reducing the tax burden on labour is their potential
eﬀect of stimulating employment demand and increasing incentives to take up jobs.
However, to the best of our knowledge there are no studies which would attempt to
demonstrate the diﬀerence in the tax wedge between those in and out of employment,
and analyse implications of tax reforms on those out of work.
In this paper we demonstrate the extent of the change in the cost of labour which
resulted from two sets of reforms announced by the J. Kaczy´ nski government in 2007,
and introduced in July 2007 and January 2008 (already by the next government who
conﬁrmed the preannounced changes). These reforms on the one hand reduced the
employee and employer rate of disability social insurance, and on the other hand
introduced an income tax credit for families with children. We contrast the extent
of these two reforms with the reduction in labour costs which would result from an
introduction of a single rate income tax proposed at the time by the liberal “Civic
Platform” party (Platforma Obywatelska, PO). The analysis is implemented using
the Polish micro-simulation model, SIMPL, applied on the data of the Household
Budgets’ Survey 2005. The SIMPL model allows us to take account of the distribution
of labour incomes and to combine this with households’ demographic characteristics.
The package of reforms introduced in 2007/2008 proves to reduce the tax burden on
those observed as working signiﬁcantly more than the simulated version of the “ﬂat
tax” and we ﬁnd very interesting diﬀerences in the eﬀects of the reforms between the
employed and the non-employed populations. The latter eﬀects of tax reforms usually
go unnoticed and as such are in our view insuﬃciently appreciated. As we demonstrate
diﬀerent wage distributions and demographics of those out of the labour market imply
very diﬀerent distributions of the tax burden and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent consequences
of the reforms in comparison to the employed population. The exercise is conducted
in such a way so as to be able to account for the entire (simulated) wage distribution
of the non-employed population, and to the best of our knowledge it is the ﬁrst such
application.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a discussion of the
diﬀerent elements of the tax wedge in Poland in the baseline scenario and discuss
the implemented reforms. Four broad components of labour costs constitute this tax
revenue between diﬀerent groups of countries see for example Mitra and Stern (2003). For interesting
discussion of the “ﬂat tax” reforms in Central and Eastern Europe see for example Stepanyan (2003)
and Keen, Kim, and Varsano (2007).
3wedge: employer social security contributions (SSCs), employee SSCs, health insurance
and income tax.3 In section 3 we present the details of the computation of the marginal
and average rates of the “klin”, and describe our approach to the analysis of the non-
employed. The data used in the analysis from the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey
(2005) and the subsets of the data we use are presented in detail in Section 4. In Section
5 we put the systemic elements together with wage distributions and demographic
characteristics and present the distributions of the average and marginal taxes on
labour in Poland under the baseline scenario and under the reformed systems. On top
of that we compute the distribution of tax rates under the hypothetical 15% “ﬂat tax”
scenario, the introduction of which has been proposed in Poland in 2005. Our analysis
is ﬁrst conducted for the sample of employed individuals (5.1) and subsequently on
the sample of the non-employed (5.2). Section 6 concludes.
2 Taxes on labour in Poland
Lets consider the simplest case of a single individual whose only source of income is
income from employee work. Then under the Polish system the net income from work
Ψ of individual i can be expressed as:





Net earnings,Ψi, is a function of the individual total labour cost Ωi reduced by the
amounts of employer’s SSCs (SSC1i), employee’s SSCs (SSC2i), health insurance
(HINFZ
i ) paid to the National Health Fund (NFZ) and income tax paid to the ﬁs-
cal authorities (IT F
i ). All these elements are a function of the total labour cost,
although the rates and schedules are applied to its diﬀerent components. The rates of
the SSCs (both employer and employee) apply to the “gross earnings” (labelled ω for
the rest of the paper), deﬁned as: Ωi − SSC1i. The Health Insurance and the Income
Tax schedules are applied on the so-called taxable income (which we shall label as ψ),
deﬁned as (Ωi − SSC1i − SSC2i).
3In the analysis we consider the entire diﬀerence between the total labour cost and net earnings
to constitute the tax wedge, which is the most common deﬁnition in the literature. Note, however,
that as rightly pointed out by Disney (2004) the matter is more complicated than that with some
elements of the wedge representing future rights to beneﬁts of the contributors in the form of PAYG
or funded pensions. Moreover, in some studies at the aggregate level the tax wedge is considered to
be the diﬀerence between the total labour cost and real consumption, i.e. accounts also for indirect
taxation (see for example Nunziata (2005)).
4In Tables 1 and 2 we present a summary of the rates of respectively the Social
Security Contributions and Income Taxes which applied in Poland in 2005. The 2005
system, i.e. the system that was in place in the year the data was collected, is taken
to be the baseline scenario for our analysis. The SSCs are divided into the employer
and employee components and the rates are presented with reference to gross earnings,
ω. The SSCs retirement and disability rates applied to all employee earnings up to
a threshold of 72,690.4 In 2005 the retirement and disability pension insurance was
divided equally between the employer and the employee, but some other elements of
the insurance were paid entirely by the employer (Work Accident Insurance, Labour
Fund contributions, and the Fund of Guaranteed Employee Beneﬁts) or entirely by
the employee (Sickness Insurance).
Table 1: Social Security Contributions in Poland, 2005
Employee SSCs
- retirement insurance 9.76%
- disability insurance 6.50%
- sickness insurance 2.45%
Employer SSCs
- retirement insurance 9.76%
- disability insurance 6.50%
- work accident insurance 1.93%
- Labour Fund 2.45%
- FGEB 0.15%
Annual threshold for retirement and disability SSCs 72,690 PLN
Notes: FGEB stands for the Fund of Guaranteed Employee Beneﬁts.
Taxable income, i.e. earnings net of the SSCs are subject to health insurance,
charged at the rate of 8.5%, most of which (7.75 percentage points of taxable income)
can then be deducted from income tax liability. Health insurance is levied individually
and there is no upper threshold where the contributions stop to be paid. There are
three rates at which individuals pay income tax in Poland: 19%, 30% and 40%. The
income bounds on which these rates apply are detailed in Table 2. Each tax payer is
granted a universal tax credit of 530.08 PLN per year, and all those employed on a
standard work contract receive an extra revenue costs allowance, which in most cases
is 1227.00 PLN.
4This is determined as a multiple of 30 of the expected average monthly gross earnings in the
economy for a given year.
5One of the most important elements of the system is the possibility of income split-
ting available to lone parents and married couples (either with or without children).
The system implies that the annual family income before being taxed is divided by two,
following which the tax liability is applied according to the standard rates and then
the computed liability is multiplied by two (a similar system operates in Germany, see
Steiner and Wrohlich (2004)).
Table 2: Income Tax in Poland, 2005
Income tax: Bounds (PLN per year)
Rate I 19% 0-37,024
Rate II 30% 37,025-74,048
Rate III 40% 74,049 +
Credits (PLN per year):
Universal credit: 530.08
Revenue costs: 1,227.00
2.1 The 2007/2008 reforms
The J. Kaczy´ nski government announced two major reforms of the tax system on
labour for introduction in several steps in 2007 and 2008. The ﬁrst element of the
package was a child tax credit at the value of 120 PLN for every dependent child which
became eﬀective in January 2007. Secondly, the government reduced the employee rate
of SSC disability insurance by 2 percentage points from 6.5% to 4.5%. This came into
eﬀect in July 2007. At the same time the government announced the introduction
of further reductions in disability insurance levels to take eﬀect in January 2008. In
autumn 2007 the government announced that the child tax credit would be extended
and the extension would be eﬀective already in 2007. An early parliamentary election,
which took place in October 2007, was most likely one of the factors behind this
extension. The value of the child tax credit increased from 120 per child to double the
value of the universal tax credit (i.e. to 1145.08 PLN at the time).
Despite this signiﬁcant electoral “giveaway” the coalition parties of the J. Kaczy´ nski
government lost the elections with the opposition Civic Platform (PO) forming the
government in coalition with the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL). Unable, or perhaps
no longer willing, to introduce the “ﬂat tax”, with which the PO is often identiﬁed in
6Poland and which it strongly advocated during the 2005 election, the new government
took up the pre-announced reforms of the SSC disability rates and implemented fur-
ther reductions. As of January 2008 the employee disability SSC rate was 1.5% (down
from 6.5% before July 2007), while the employer disability SSC rate was reduced from
6.5% to 4.5%. The Tusk government also upheld the decision concerning the child tax
credit which has since been implemented at the value of two times the universal tax
credit for every child.5
In Figure 1A we present the speciﬁc marginal tax rates implied by the the four
elements of the Polish system of taxes on labour in the baseline 2005 scenario for a
single adult without children (on total labour cost, Ωi). Payments of the HI start only
once the level of income is high enough to exhaust the limits of the the revenue costs
allowance and the universal tax credit. After that the rates are applied on the entire
taxable income and over the range of labour costs from 507 PLN to 917 PLN per
month the health insurance contribution is equal to the income tax due. This explains
why initially the marginal rate of the HI is 12.8%. Above 917 PLN per month the
marginal rate of HI rate is 5.73% of total labour costs up to the SSC threshold (total
labour cost = 7,321 PLN per month), and 7.94% on labour cost beyond this threshold.
On Figure 1A we can also see the changes in the marginal rates of IT and the
change in SSCs once individuals are not longer liable to pay retirement and disabil-
ity insurance.6 Figure 1B shows the total marginal tax rate (again conditional on Ωi)
for a single adult without children in the baseline 2005 scenario (below referred to as
the“base system”) and for the ﬁrst earner in a couple with two dependent children.
In the latter case we show the total MTRs under the base system and in three reform
scenarios. The MTRs are computed in scenarios with reduced SSC disability rates
(hereafter labelled as “ZUS Reform”), with the entire 2007/2008 reform package, i.e.
including the child tax credit (“ZUS+CTC Reform”), and in the hypothetical scenario
of introducing a 15% “ﬂat tax” reform with other elements of the 2005 system kept
unchanged (“15% ﬂat tax Reform”).7 In Section 5 we use the same three reform sys-
5Note that the child tax credit is implemented slightly diﬀerently than the universal tax credit. It
becomes eﬀective only if there is any income tax remaining after the application of the universal tax
credit and deduction of the deductible part of health insurance. After that it operates as a standard
non-refundable tax credit.
6Note that the change in the rate of income tax at the SSC threshold relates only to the fact that
for levels of total labour cost beyond 7,321 PLN per month (corresponding to the SSC threshold) the
level of taxable income increases.
7The “ﬂat tax” reform we consider is a straightforward uniﬁcation of the tax rates in the Polish
7tems to present the inﬂuence of the scenarios on the actual changes in taxes of the
Polish population.
Several interesting points can be noted with reference to Figure 1B. First of all
the diﬀerence between the MTRs of the single person without children and the ﬁrst
earner in a couple under the base system is a result of the joint taxation system for
couples. Secondly, we can see how strongly the ZUS and the ZUS+CTC reforms aﬀect
the MTRs relative to the base system and how diﬀerently they change the marginal
rates relative to the 15% ﬂat tax reform. The introduction of the child tax credit for
the one earner family with two children we consider in Figure 1B aﬀects the marginal
tax rate in the range of the total labour cost from 1387 PLN per month (below which
the family is not liable to pay any tax) to 3399 PLN per month (above which the entire
credit is exhausted).8 Interestingly, relative to the ZUS and the ZUS+CTC reforms,
the MTR under the 15% “ﬂat tax” is lower only for incomes above the SSC threshold,
where the eﬀects of changes in the rates of disability insurance no longer apply.
3 Calculating individual-level tax wedge
The calculations presented in this paper are conducted using the Polish micro-simulation
model SIMPL.9 In the analysis presented here we aim to show the level of the overall
tax on labour conditional on total labour cost at individual level. In other words we
want to answer the question - what the diﬀerence is between how much it costs to em-
ploy an individual and how much he/she receives “in the pocket”. Because of the joint
system of taxation, and because individuals can combine employee work (which is the
focus of our study) with other forms of income subject to income taxation, identifying
the amount of tax which relates only to employee work at individual level requires
several assumptions. This problem does not relate to SSCs which are subtracted at
individual level, but there are also consequences of joint taxation for the computation
of Health Insurance. The way we allocate the speciﬁc elements of the Income Tax and
Health Insurance to individuals is discussed in detail in Appendix A. As we explain
income tax system. The universal tax credit is maintained in the system. Removing it would naturally
increase average tax rates for all individuals and marginal tax rates for some relative to the “ﬂat tax”
reform we model.
8The two values correspond respectively to about the 25th and 85th centile of the entire distrib-
ution of monthly total labour cost among the employed sample.
9For more details see www.simpl.pl.
8the expression for net income from equation 1 can be made more speciﬁc to refer only
to income from permanent employment as:






• Ψi,e is individual net income resulting from employment,
• Ωi,e is the total employment labour cost,
• SSC1i,e and SSC2i,e are social security contributions paid on employment in-
come,
• HINFZ
i,e is total health insurance paid to the NFZ on employment income,
• IT F
i,e is total individual level income tax paid to ﬁscal authorities on employment
income.
The important thing to bear in mind from the point of view of the analysis pre-
sented below is that the tax rates we calculate relate only to taxes on reported per-
manent earnings, and that in case both partners in couples have taxable incomes the
burden is allocated in accordance with the general accounting rules governing their
allocation (see Appendix A for details).
3.1 Marginal and average tax rates
The analysis in this paper focuses on average and marginal tax rates as implied by
the system described in Section 2 and the eﬀects on these resulting from several policy
reforms. Given the expression for net income presented above, the marginal and
average tax rates on employment can be computed in the following way.





The marginal tax rate (MTR) on employment income µi,e is computed as:






9where Ψi,e and Ωi,e are deﬁned as in equation 2, Ω∗
i,e is total labour cost increased by a
fraction, and Ψ∗
i,e the net income computed following this fractional increase of the total
labour cost.10 Because of the interdependencies in income taxation among partners in
couples, especially when they both have employment incomes, in these cases we only
increase the earnings of the partner with higher earnings and the resulting marginal
tax rate is assumed to be the same for both partners.11
4 Data
The data used in our analysis come from the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey 2005
(Badanie Bud˙ zet´ ow Gospodarstw Domowych, below referred to as BBGD). The BBGD
is an annual survey of household incomes and expenditures and contains detailed
demographic and incomes information on about 35,000 Polish households. As Bargain
et al. (2007) demonstrated the quality of the BBGD incomes data - especially with
reference to earnings information is very high and very closely reﬂects administrative
data.12
The analysis is presented in two parts, one showing the eﬀect of the reforms on those
reporting positive employment earnings (the employed sample), and the other focusing
on the eﬀect of those out of employment (the non-employed sample). In both samples
we identify individuals whom we deﬁne as “labour market ﬂexible”, i.e. actually
working (with employment earnings) or potentially working. From the sample of
“labour market ﬂexible” individuals we exclude individuals aged less than 18 and over
the pension age (65 for men, 60 for women), the self-employed, recipients of retirement
or disability pension, full-time students and dependent children. Our analysis focuses
on the “tax units” of these labour market (LM) ﬂexible individuals, where a tax unit
is an adult single individual or a married couple (with or without dependent children).
10In our calculations we increase the total labour cost by 0.01%.
11It is important to note also that in computing the value of the “klin” for the simulated reforms we
make an assumption that what remains unchanged is the value of “gross earnings” (ω), and the net
wage and the total labour cost is computed with reference to this value. Naturally in the post-reform
“equilibrium” the value of gross earnings may change and the way it changes will be a function of the
relative elasticities of demand for and supply of labour. In the short run however, keeping the gross
wage constant seems to be the most natural assumption to make, since labour contracts are written
with reference to the gross wage.
12For example Bargain et al. (2007) demonstrate that although there is an underrepresentation of
top incomes in the BBGD, in terms of employment incomes this applies essentially only to the top
centile of the distribution.
10Couples where only one person is LM ﬂexible will also be included. In the case of
a married couple where one of the partners is employed and the other is not but
is classiﬁed as LM ﬂexible, this family will enter the analysis twice. First we shall
consider the marginal and average taxes which are paid by the employed partner (in
Section 5.1), and then will analyse the tax burden of the non-employed partner. The
case of tax burden on non-employed “second earners” in couples is in fact a rather
special one, and we treat it separately in the analysis of the eﬀect of the reforms on
the non-employed in Section 5.2. We focus our analysis of labour taxes on reported
(and simulated) permanent earnings and assume that temporary earnings, if such are
reported in the data, remain unchanged.13
Table 3: Sample characteristics: labour market ﬂexible individuals
Employed sample Non-employed sample
Men Women All Men Women All
All 13117 11868 24985 5505 10052 15557
Age group (column percentages)
18-24 0.092 0.091 0.091 0.283 0.177 0.214
25-34 0.299 0.278 0.289 0.261 0.297 0.285
35-44 0.273 0.290 0.281 0.177 0.233 0.213
45-54 0.272 0.311 0.291 0.217 0.245 0.235
55+ 0.063 0.031 0.047 0.063 0.048 0.053
Education: (column percentages)
Primary or none 0.072 0.056 0.065 0.219 0.199 0.206
Vocational 0.437 0.212 0.330 0.462 0.361 0.397
Secondary 0.336 0.457 0.394 0.270 0.373 0.337
Higher 0.154 0.273 0.211 0.049 0.066 0.060
Children: (column percentages)
No children 0.373 0.387 0.380 0.673 0.342 0.459
One child 0.277 0.296 0.286 0.138 0.265 0.220
Two children 0.249 0.240 0.245 0.120 0.240 0.198
More than two children 0.102 0.076 0.090 0.069 0.153 0.123
Married 0.785 0.688 0.739 0.432 0.702 0.607
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD-2005 data.
These criteria leave us with 24,985 individuals in the employed sample (living in
19,949 tax units/families), and with 15,557 individuals in the non-employed sample
(living in 14,651 tax units/families).14 Some basic descriptive statistics concerning
13The BBGD survey only records if an income source from employment received in the month of
the interview is “permanent” or “temporary” - temporary jobs are those that last or are expected
to last for up to three months. In the microsimulation we assume that all temporary earnings are
received for three months, and permanent earnings for the whole calendar year.
14Note that some of these families overlap between the samples, since an employed individual in a
one earner couple lives in the same family as his/her non-employed partner.
11Table 4: Sample characteristics - family types of labour market ﬂexible individuals
Employed sample Non-employed sample
Men Women All Men Women All
All 13117 11868 24985 5505 10052 15557
Family type:
Singles (number), of which: 2824 3710 6534 3128 2996 6124
- Without children 0.938 0.692 0.798 0.970 0.659 0.817
- With one child 0.037 0.201 0.130 0.017 0.187 0.100
- With 2+ children 0.025 0.107 0.071 0.013 0.155 0.082
Couples with one LM ﬂexible partner (number) 1892 2245 4137 594 2785 3379
of which:
- Without children 0.396 0.338 0.365 0.429 0.296 0.320
- With one child 0.274 0.298 0.287 0.274 0.238 0.245
- With 2+ children 0.330 0.364 0.348 0.296 0.465 0.436
Couples with two LM ﬂexible partners:
One earner couples (number), of which: 3365 877 4242 877 3365 4242
- Without children 0.129 0.245 0.153 0.245 0.129 0.153
- With one child 0.347 0.301 0.338 0.301 0.347 0.338
- With 2+ children 0.524 0.454 0.509 0.454 0.524 0.509
Two earner couples (number), of which: 5036 5036 10072 — — —
- Without children 0.209 0.209 0.209 — — —
- With one child 0.365 0.365 0.365 — — —
- With 2+ children 0.425 0.425 0.425 — — —
No earner couples (number), of which: — — — 906 906 1812
- Without children — — — 0.223 0.223 0.223
- With one child — — — 0.305 0.305 0.305
- With 2+ children — — — 0.472 0.472 0.472
Total number of families 19949 14651
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD-2005 data.
the two sample are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Individuals in the non-employed
sample, especially men, are much more likely to be young and have signiﬁcantly lower
levels of education (Table 3). As many as 28% of men in the non-employed sample
are aged 18-24, compared to 9.2% in the employed sample. 21.9% of non-employed
men have only primary education or none, compared to 7.2% in of those who are
employed. Employed men are more likely to have at least one child (62.7% relative
to 32.7% among the non-employed men), and are almost twice as likely to be married
as those observed as non-employed. With regard to children, the diﬀerences are much
smaller for women, although the proportion of women with more than two children
is only 7.6% in the employed sample and 15.3% in the non-employed sample. As
12we can see in Table 4 a substantial proportion of single individuals have at least
one child (respectively 20.0% and 18.2% in the employed and non-employed sample),
and the proportions are still higher in the case of couples. For those with one LM
ﬂexible partner 63.5% and 68.0% of couples have at least one child respectively in
the employed and the non-employed sample. Among one earner couples as many as
84.7% have at least one child, and the proportion is almost as high for two earner
couples (79.1%). Couples with two LM ﬂexible partners where none of them works
are not very common, though the proportion of those having at last one child among
these is also very high (77.7%). The diﬀerences in characteristics of the employed and
non-employed samples, especially with regard to age and education will be reﬂected
in the level of wages, as will diﬀerences in family composition between the employed
and non-employed samples. The latter will also ﬁnd a reﬂexion in the diﬀerent way
the child tax credit will aﬀect the tax burden on those with children.
5 “Klin”-ing up: reforming taxes on labour in Poland
Below we present the distributions of marginal and average taxes in Poland under
the base 2005 system and compare them to those resulting from the two introduced
reforms described in Section 2.1 and to the 15% “ﬂat tax” scenario. In Section 5.1
we present the distributions for the employed sample, while in Section 5.2 for the
non-employed sample.
5.1 Distribution of the “klin”: the employed population
Results of the calculations for the employed sample are presented in Figure 2 and in
Table 5. Panels A and B of Figure 2 show the cumulative distributions of the total
marginal and average tax rates for the entire employed population, while in Panels C
and D we show the distributions separately for the sub-sample of employed individuals
with children. The ﬁgures conﬁrm the basic conclusion we drew on the basis of Figure
1B, but complete the picture with demonstrating the eﬀect of the reforms taking
account of the composition of the population and the full observed distribution of
wages. The results show a very signiﬁcant reduction in the level of the tax burden on
wages following the 2007/2008 reform package. The mean value of the total average
13rate of labour tax has fallen by 7.6 percentage points for all employed individuals, and
by 8.6 percentage points for those with children. This corresponds to reductions of,
respectively, 18% and 21%, and represents the most signiﬁcant reduction in the “klin”
since the beginning of the economic reforms in Poland in 1989.
The ZUS reforms on their own have reduced the level of the “klin” for a large
proportion of the employed population by much more compared to the hypothetical
15% “ﬂat tax” reform. The “ﬂat tax” reform does result in some MTR falling to levels
which are not achieved by the other reforms considered. For example, the 1st percentile
of the post “ﬂat tax” reform MTR distribution is as low as 21.3%, compared to 25.4%
under the ZUS reform and ZUS+CTC package (see Table 5), and down from 32.6%
under the baseline system. However, for a great majority of working individuals the
latter two reforms reduce the MTR by much more than the simulated “ﬂat tax”. For
example the 25th percentile of the distribution is 40.1% under the ZUS reform, 35.3%
under the joint ZUS+CTC package and 43.2% under the “ﬂat tax” regime - down
only by 2.7 percentage points relative to the baseline. Figure 2B shows the values for
average tax rates and we can now clearly see the eﬀects of the introduced reforms. The
average ATR falls from 41.6% in the baseline system to 35.6% after the ZUS reform
and 34.0% when we add the child tax credit. The reduction is much higher compared
to the average ATR at the level of 39.6% resulting from the introduction of the “ﬂat
tax”. The picture is of course even more striking when we consider only those with
children. The median ATR falls from 42.3% to 31.7% under the ZUS+CTC reform,
and only to 40.3% under the “ﬂat tax” scenario.
Table 5: Total marginal and average tax rates, base and reformed systems: employed sample
Marginal tax rate Average tax rate
1st perc. 25th perc. median 75th perc. 99th perc. mean median mean
All:
Base system 0.326 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.533 0.455 0.423 0.416
ZUS Reform 0.254 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.483 0.401 0.363 0.356
ZUS+CTC Reform 0.254 0.353 0.401 0.401 0.483 0.382 0.340 0.340
15% ﬂat tax Reform 0.213 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.476 0.424 0.403 0.396
With children:
Base system 0.326 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.533 0.455 0.423 0.415
ZUS Reform 0.254 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.483 0.400 0.363 0.356
ZUS+CTC Reform 0.254 0.317 0.401 0.401 0.483 0.369 0.317 0.329
15% ﬂat tax Reform 0.213 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.476 0.423 0.403 0.396
Source: Authors’ calculations on BBGD-2005 data using SIMPL microsimulation model.
145.2 Distribution of the “klin”: the non-employed population
Results presented in this section demonstrate how diﬀerent the consequences of tax
reforms can be on those who are non-employed, and who potentially could be working.
One of the justiﬁcation for reducing the “klin” is that high taxes on labour lead to
lower employment through, on the one hand, high employer costs and, on the other,
lower net remuneration thus aﬀecting supply of labour. From this point of view the
eﬀect of tax reforms on those who are out of employment is extremely important.
We saw in Section 4 how diﬀerent the non-employed sample is with respect to such
characteristics as education, age, the presence of children, etc. These diﬀerences in
characteristics will translate into diﬀerent (on average lower) wage levels, while the
diﬀerences in family structure will aﬀect net earnings directly through the tax system.
In Section 5.2.1 we ﬁrst outline the way we propose to deal with the fact that we
do not observe the wages of the non-employed individuals. Subsequently our analysis
of the distribution of tax rates for the non-employed is divided into two parts. In
Section 5.2.2 we examine the tax rates of “ﬁrst earners”. These are either single
non-working individuals in the non-employed sample, or non-employed individuals in
couples where only one of the partners is labour market ﬂexible, or - in cases where
both partners belong to the non-employed sample - the partner with higher expected
wage. For these ﬁrst earners we analyse the distributions of marginal and average tax
rates under diﬀerent scenarios. In Section 5.2.3 we analyse the tax burden on “second
earners”, i.e. on labour market ﬂexible partners of employed individuals.
5.2.1 Accounting for the distribution of wages of the non-employed
As in all studies on the position of the non-employed on the labour market the crucial
piece of information we miss is information on their wage level. Because of much lower
variance of the distribution of expected wages compared to the distribution of observed
wages, and because of signiﬁcant non-linearity of the Polish tax system (especially
the post-reform system including the child tax credit), using a simple expected wage
distribution would mistakenly represent the level of taxes and changes in it. The
method we propose to adopt relies on simulating an entire distribution of earnings
for the non-employed sample by drawing from the distribution of the residual in the
wage equation. This means that for every individual i in the non-employed sample we
15generate the gross monthly wage as:
c Wi = exp(ˆ wi + εi), (5)
where ˆ wi is the expected (log) gross wage of individual i, and εi is drawn from the
distribution of the residuals in the wage equation.15 In most applications where one
accounts for the entire distribution of wages for the non-employed the ﬁnal results,
such as for example labour supply response, are integrated over the distribution of
the residual (see e.g. Myck and Reed (2006)). Since generally it is impossible to ﬁnd
an algebraic solution for the integral, the results are generated as some form of the
average over a number of draws from the distribution of ε. In our case we can generate
a number (S) of wage measures for each individual by drawing from the distribution
of ε. This means that we produce S measures of gross wage for each non-employed
individual, each taking the form of:
c W
s
i = exp(ˆ wi + ε
s
i). (6)
In our analysis integrating the results over the distribution of the residuals for
each individual, would imply producing average rates out of the marginal and average
rates computed for each individual for the S wages. This averaging process would
imply that, ﬁrst of all, it would be very likely that the averaged marginal rates would
not correspond to the marginal rates implied by the system, and secondly, that there
would be an unclear relationship between the distributions of the marginal and the
average rates, and the results would be diﬃcult to interpret.
Because our analysis focuses on the examination of entire distributions of tax rates,
the solution we propose is to compute the corresponding marginal and average tax rates
under each of the examined systems for each measure of c W s
i , and then to analyse the
resulting S distributions of tax rates jointly. This approach will correctly reﬂect the
entire distribution of gross wages and the tax rates implied by the diﬀerent systems,
and will not suﬀer from the shortcoming of averaging the rates mentioned above.16
15The wage equation is estimated separately for men and women using the Heckman two-step
model to account for labour market selection. Simulated out of work incomes are used as instruments
for selection. Details are available from the authors on request.
16In the application we use ten draws from the distribution of the residual for every non-employed
individual, i.e. S = 10. This is usually considered suﬃcient to correctly reconstruct the entire wage
distribution (see e.g. Myck and Reed (2006)).
165.2.2 Marginal and average taxes rates on non-employed ﬁrst earners
We begin the analysis of the eﬀects of the reforms on the non-employed sample by
looking at the changes in distributions of marginal and average taxes of “ﬁrst earners”
in the non-employed sample. The ﬁrst earners include single non-employed individuals,
the non-employed LM ﬂexible partner in couples with only one LM ﬂexible person,
and the partner with higher expected wage (exp(ˆ wi)) in no earner couples. Two
interesting points are worth noting with respect to the diﬀerences in composition of
this part of the non-employed sample relative to the employed sample. First of all
the proportion of men and women with children is similar among the employed and
the non-employed, though in the latter sample families are more likely to have more
than one child. For example among singles 20.1% of employed and 18.2% of non-
employed individuals have at least one child, but only 10.7% of working single women
have more than one child compared to 15.5% among non-working single women (see
Table 4). Similarly about 79% of two earner couples and 78% of no earner couples
have children, but the proportion of those with more than one child is again greater
for the sample of no earner couples. Secondly however, despite these similarities in
terms of family structure, as we pointed out earlier, there are important diﬀerences in
other characteristics between the employed and the non-employed sample, especially
age and education. These diﬀerences will play a crucial role in determining the way
the simulated reforms aﬀect changes in the value of the tax wedge.
Table 6: Total marginal and average tax rates, base and reformed systems: non-employed
sample, ﬁrst earners
Marginal tax rate Average tax rate
1st perc. 25th perc. median 75th perc. 99th perc. mean median mean
All:
Base system 0.326 0.454 0.459 0.459 0.530 0.442 0.399 0.390
ZUS Reform 0.254 0.396 0.401 0.401 0.480 0.385 0.338 0.328
ZUS+CTC Reform 0.254 0.396 0.401 0.401 0.480 0.375 0.326 0.323
15% ﬂat tax Reform 0.326 0.427 0.432 0.432 0.476 0.417 0.380 0.376
With children:
Base system 0.326 0.454 0.459 0.459 0.530 0.429 0.385 0.381
ZUS Reform 0.254 0.396 0.401 0.401 0.480 0.371 0.326 0.318
ZUS+CTC Reform 0.254 0.317 0.317 0.396 0.401 0.338 0.317 0.302
15% ﬂat tax Reform 0.326 0.427 0.427 0.432 0.476 0.407 0.370 0.369
Source: Authors’ calculations on BBGD-2005 data using SIMPL microsimulation model.
Similar to the results presented for the employed sample, the cumulative distrib-
17utions of total marginal and average tax rates with respect to the total labour cost
are presented graphically (Figure 3) and summarised in Table 6. The ﬁrst thing that
distinguishes the non-employed sample is a much higher proportion of low wage indi-
viduals who as a result of the low wage pay very low marginal and average tax. The
marginal rate of 32.6% applies to about 15% of the entire non-employed sample, and
over 20% of the non-employed sample of ﬁrst earners with children. As a result of
lower wages in comparison to the employed population, the non-employed ﬁrst earners
pay less income tax (or do not pay any tax at all) and consequently the eﬀect of the
child tax credit reform is much less pronounced in comparison to the employed sample.
For example while the mean ATR in the employed sample falls by 1.6 percentage point
following the CTC reform (i.e. when we compare the ZUS reform with the ZUS+CTC
reform), it falls by only 0.5 percentage points in the sample of non-employed ﬁrst
earners. When we look only at those with children the diﬀerence in the means is 2.7
vs. 1.6 percentage points, while the median ATR falls by 4.6 percentage points for
the employed sample and by only 0.9 percentage points among the non-employed ﬁrst
earners.
Despite the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of the CTC the general pattern of the eﬀects of
the simulated reforms is similar to what we saw for the employed sample. The ZUS
reform produces a very signiﬁcant reduction in the level of the tax burden on labour,
and the child tax credit contributes to a further sizeable reduction. One important
point which distinguishes the eﬀect on the non-employed ﬁrst earners is that, due to
lower wage levels of the non-employed sample relative to the employed, the number
of those whose marginal tax rate is 21.3% following the 15% “ﬂat tax” reform is very
low, and the 1st percentile MTR is already above that level. This is despite the fact
that the entire distribution of wages is accounted for in the process. Also, because
on average the non-employed pay less tax than the employed sample the reduction in
the average level of taxes resulting from the “ﬂat tax” reform in slightly higher in the
case of the latter sample. The simulated reform reduces the tax burden on average
by 2.0 percentage points for the employed individuals and only by 1.4 percentage
points among the non-employed. These are much lower reductions in comparison to
the eﬀects of the entire ZUS+CTC package, namely 6.7 percentage point (17.2%) for
the non-employed ﬁrst earners, and 7.6 percentage points (18.3%) for the employed
sample.
185.2.3 Average taxes rates on non-employed second earners
The problem of the tax burden on second earners has been frequently discussed in
the labour supply literature, and has been shown to be especially severe in cases of
systems with joint income taxation like Poland or Germany, or with in-work beneﬁts
means-tested at family-level like the UK’s Working Tax Credit.17 In the analysis we
focus only on the average tax rates of these second earners. The rates are computed
diﬀerently than in the case of couples where both partners are employed (as described
in details in Appendix A), as otherwise we would have to account for the eﬀect of
entry into employment on the average tax rate of the already employed partner.18
Such an analysis would then imply sharing of the advantages of the tax system (such
as universal tax credit or the child tax credit) between partners and would wrongly
represent the actual rate of tax that the family has to pay on the earnings of the second
earner.










where Ωj,e is total labour cost of employing the second earner j, Ψ
f
i+j,e is the total
net family income resulting from the joint employment of both partners, and Ψ
f
i,e is
the total net family income resulting from the employment of the partner observed as
employed.
Table 7: Total average tax rates, base and reformed
systems: non-employed second earners
All With children
median mean median mean
Base system 0.445 0.442 0.444 0.441
ZUS Reform 0.386 0.383 0.386 0.383
ZUS+CTC Reform 0.353 0.351 0.342 0.345
15% ﬂat tax Reform 0.421 0.418 0.421 0.417
Source: Authors’ calculations on BBGD-2005 data using SIMPL
microsimulation model.
17For discussion of the consequences of the German system see e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich (2004).
For analysis of consequences of means testing of in-work support see Blundell et al. (2000), while for
a comparative discussion of the issue in Germany, Poland and the UK see Haan et al. (2008).
18The same argument applies of course to the issue of the marginal tax rates of the second earner
and the working partner, which is why we leave the analysis of marginal tax rates out.
19In Figure 4 we present the cumulative distributions of the average tax rates com-
puted using formula 7. The results are also summarised in Table 7 for the entire
sample of one earner couples and for those with children. As we can see, since a great
majority of one earner couples (where the second partner is LM ﬂexible) have children
(about 85%, see Table 4) the results for all individuals and for the sub-sample with
children are very similar. The simulations conﬁrm what we mentioned above, namely
that the tax burden on second earners is generally higher than for ﬁrst earners. For
example, while the mean ATR on labour among non-employed ﬁrst-earners is 39.0%,
that on the second earners is 44.2%.
As we can see in Figure 4 and in Table 7, the 2007/2008 reform package introduced
a very signiﬁcant reduction of taxes on second earners. The tax wedge following the
ZUS+CTC reform is not only much lower in comparison to the eﬀects of the 15% “ﬂat
tax” reform, but the extent of the reduction for second earners is also much greater
in comparison to the non-employed ﬁrst earners and to those who are employed. The
mean ATR for second earners falls by 9.1 percentage points (21%) for all individuals
and by 9.6 percentage points (22%) when we consider only one earner couples with
children. What is especially important is that for the sample of non-employed second
earners we can see the largest eﬀect of the child tax credit reform. For those with
children the mean ATR is reduced from 38.3% to 34.5% (3.8 percentage points). This
compares to the reduction by 2.7 percentage points for those with children in the
employed sample (Table 5), and by 1.6 percentage points for the non-employed ﬁrst
earners with children (Table 6).
6 Conclusion
The “klin” between net earnings and the total labour cost in Poland has been signiﬁ-
cantly reduced through a reform package that came into eﬀect in 2007 and 2008. As
our analysis demonstrates the reduction in the tax wedge resulting from cuts in the
disability social security contributions and from an introduction of a generous child
tax credit has been much higher compared to a hypothetical, though widely discussed,
introduction of a 15% “ﬂat tax”. The recent reforms constitute an unprecedented
reduction in the level of taxes on labour in the history of the Polish economic trans-
formation. According to our analysis the mean value of the average tax rate on labour
20earnings fell from 41.6% to 34.0% among the employed population. If instead of the
introduced reforms the government opted for a 15% “ﬂat tax” reform the resulting
mean ATR would fall only to 39.6%.
This reduction in the tax wedge is likely to contribute to improvements on the
labour market both through the likely increases in labour demand and through the
reaction on the supply side as work becomes more ﬁnancially attractive. From this
point of view several interesting conclusions follow from our examination of the eﬀects
of the tax reforms on the tax wedge of those who remain out of the labour market. In
the analysis we implemented a methodology which allowed us to account for the entire
distribution of wages of the non-employed. This is especially important in highly non-
linear tax systems, and so particularly relevant for the case of the Polish system after
the introduction of the child tax credit. In the analysis we separately examined the
eﬀects of the tax reforms on ﬁrst and second earners, and while in both cases the eﬀects
of the implemented reforms are overall much greater in comparison to the simulated
15% “ﬂat tax” reform, there are important diﬀerences in the eﬀects between ﬁrst and
second earners. This partly relates to the demographic characteristics of the samples
and partly to the diﬀerent level of wages they could receive. Because of the latter,
while the eﬀects of the reductions in social security contributions result in similar
reductions in the tax wedge, the eﬀects of the child tax credit are much weaker on
the ﬁrst non-employed earners relative both to those on the second (non-employed)
earners and on the employed population.
The reduction in the tax on labour is likely to contribute to increases in employment
in Poland. However, compared to the SSC reform, the introduction of the child tax
credit is unlikely to play an important role in the case of families where no one is
employed. This is despite the fact that a high proportion of these families are families
with children, and relates to their low potential level of earnings. On the other hand
the child tax credit leads to signiﬁcant reductions in the level of the tax wedge for non-
employed second earners. This is partly because almost 85% of one earner couples have
children, and as many as 43% have two children or more, and suggests that the child
tax credit reform could provide an important stimulus to an increase in the proportion
of two earner families.
The analysis also shows that it is generally important to consider the demographic
characteristics of households as well as incomes from sources other than earnings in
21the analysis of the tax wedge. In the Polish case, the importance of the ﬁrst element
becomes crucial with the introduction of the child tax credit.
The discussion about the level of tax on labour in Poland has not ended with
with the introduction of the 2007/2008 reforms. In fact the government has already
introduced further reforms and plans to reduce income tax rates to 18% and 30% as
of January 2009. It seems however that these reforms will only have a minor eﬀect
on the majority of the working and non-working population compared to the recent
reforms, especially that as we saw in this paper a signiﬁcant proportion of working
(and non-working) individuals pay little or no income tax after the introduction of the
child tax credit.
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24Appendix A: Allocating taxes to individuals
The simple expression for the relationship between net and gross (permanent) earn-
ings gets more complicated in the scenario where the individual receives income from
sources other than employee work, for example from rent. Because of the non-linearity
of the tax system, and because of the interdependencies of the level of HI and income
tax, the level of income tax levied on employment will in general be diﬀerent from
that presented in equation 1. To compute the level of tax relating only to employee
employment we ﬁrst compute the overall level of income tax of the individual, and
then the amount of tax the individual would have to pay if his/her employee income
were zero. The resulting diﬀerence in the level of income tax then identiﬁes the income
tax on the individual’s earnings. Formally the computation of income tax relating to
earnings can be expressed in the following way:
IT
0
i (Ωi) = τ(ωi + Φi|ωi > 0) − τ(Φi|ωi = 0), (8)
where Ωi is total labour cost, ωi is taxable income from earnings and Φi is taxable
income from sources other than earnings. Function τ(.) is the income tax schedule.
For the moment we ignore the payment of health insurance which we shall discuss in
detail below. This means that IT 0
i (Ωi) is the computed income tax due taking into
account the elements of the tax system presented in Table ??, i.e. the revenue costs,
the universal tax credit and the child tax credit.
The second diﬃculty concerning “individualisation” of the tax wedge is the fact
that income is taxed jointly for married couples in Poland. This means that in cases
where only one person in the couple is working, or if there are high disproportions
in gross incomes between partners, the income tax (conditional on gross earnings) for
a married person is lower compared to someone who is not married. Since income
splitting is available also to lone parents, their income tax bill will also be lower
compared to single individuals without children. These features were evident from the
analysis of Figure 1. In the case of lone parents and for many couples the computation
of the individual net earnings will proceed in the same way as presented in equations
1 and 8. For couples this will be the case when only one partner in couples has
income from earnings and the other partner has no other income which is subject
to income tax. In these cases the tax schedule will of course take into account the
splitting element, but apart from that the allocation of the tax is straightforward. In
cases of couples where either both partners have income from earnings, or there are
other incomes in the family which are subject to income taxation we “individualise”
25income taxation of earnings in the following way.19 First family level taxable incomes
are computed in two scenarios, with and without permanent earnings incomes:
ψ
1




fj = (Φmj + Φwj|ωmj = 0,ωwj = 0), (10)
where ψ1
fj, the overall tax bill of family j, is computed included the reported
earnings of the two partners and ψ2
fj assuming the earnings are zero. For each of
the two measures of taxable incomes we ﬁrst subtract the revenue costs for those
partners who are employees (conditional on having employment income). Then an
appropriate applicable tax rate is chosen by applying the tax schedule to half of the
sum of partners’ incomes (given the income splitting formula). This tax rate is then
applied to each of the taxable incomes (reduced by the value of the individual revenue
cost) and in this way the so-called “due tax” is computed. Following this we subtract
the universal tax credit from individual “due taxes”. In the ﬁrst step the full value
of the universal tax credit is allocated to each of the two partners. In the second
step if any of the universal tax credits - due to low levels of taxable income of one
of the partners - are left unclaimed, they are transferred to the partner with higher
taxable income to be subtracted from the taxable income of that partner. Income tax
on earnings at individual level is calculated by subtracting individual income taxes
using ψ1
fj from individual taxes using ψ2
fj. The values thus calculated (IT 0
mj(Ωmj) and
IT 0
wj(Ωwj)) constitute individual incomes taxes before the payment of health insurance,
i.e. correspond to IT 0
i (Ωi) from equation 8.
Health insurance is computed on individual level and separately on each source of
taxable income.20 Generally the HI is computed in the following way. Focusing for
the moment on income from earnings, if the amount of income tax due (IT 0
i (Ωi), i.e.
prior to subtracting the HI credit) is less than 7.75% of taxable income, then the
individual pays health insurance (to the National Health Fund) at the level equivalent
to the total amount of income tax due, and as a result pays no income tax to the
ﬁscal authorities (i.e. HINFZ = IT 0
i (Ωi) and IT F
i = 0). Once income tax due exceeds
7.75% of taxable income, then any income tax above that needs to be paid to the ﬁscal
authorities (IT F
i > 0), and at the same time individuals pay the part of HI which
does not count as a tax credit (up to the value of 8.5% of taxable income).
19We are grateful to Lidia Kuleta for clarifying to us the practical details of income tax calculation.
20The only exceptions are income from rent and investment incomes.
26In most cases the amount of income tax IT 0
i (Ωi) will exceed the 8.5% of taxable
income from earnings, and in the case of two earner couples this holds in general for
both partners (once we allocate individual incomes taxes, IT 0
mj(Ωmj), and IT 0
wj(Ωwj)).
It is only after health insurance payments are deducted and there is still income
tax to pay that the child tax credit (in the simulation of the reform) aﬀects the amount
of tax paid. For couples we proceed with the application of the child tax credit in the
same way as int he case of the universal tax credit, i.e. ﬁrst divide the total tax credit
available to a couple by two, and then if some of it remains unclaimed by one of the
partners it is “transferred” to the other.
The expression for net income from equation 1 can be generalised to refer only to
income from permanent employment as:






• Ψi,e is additional net income resulting from employment,
• Ωi,e is the total employment labour cost,
• SSC1i,e and SSC2i,e are social security contributions paid on employment in-
come,
• HINFZ
i,e is total health insurance paid to the NFZ on employment income,
• IT F
i,e is total individual level income tax paid to ﬁscal authorities on employment
income.
27Appendix B - Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Marginal tax rates implied by the Polish tax system
1A - Speciﬁc MTRs: single, no children 1B - Total MTRs: by family type
Note: In Figure 1B, F1 refers to single person without children, and F2 to one earner couple with two children
(second partner assumed to have no income subject to SSCs or income tax).
Source: Authors’ calculations using SIMPL microsimulation model.Figure 2: Marginal and average tax rates of working individuals - base and reform systems
2A - Marginal tax rates, all 2B - Average tax rates, All
2C - Marginal tax rates, with children 2D - Average tax rates, with children
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of BBGD 2005 data using the SIMPL micro-simulation model.
29Figure 3: Marginal and average tax rates of non working “ﬁrst earners” - base and reform systems
3A - Marginal tax rates, all 3B - Average tax rates, All
3C - Marginal tax rates, with children 3D - Average tax rates, with children
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of BBGD 2005 data using the SIMPL micro-simulation model.
Figure 4: Average tax rates of non working “second earners” - base and reform systems
4A - Average tax rates, all 4B - Average tax rates, with children
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of BBGD 2005 data using the SIMPL micro-simulation model.
30